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The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection 
between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called 
the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-
dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future 
things equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are 
metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to 
the much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory 
or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of 
time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time 
presents a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no 
change on the B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as 
follows: of course, there is change, so the B-theory must be false. 
What I plan to do in this paper is to argue that in some sense there is 
change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, there is no change 
on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of 
change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with 
respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that 
things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional 
Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with 
respect to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading 
of these three instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so 
there is change on the B-theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical 
reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and therefore 
there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and 
the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of time, 
according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, 
where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time 
and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a 
novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on 
the B-theory or not.1 
 
In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this 
far from being an innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a model 
of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-theory. 
From this, one can reasonably think as follow: of course there is change, 
so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to argue 
that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, 
there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of 
change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with 
respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that 
things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional 
Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect 
to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three 
instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on 
the B-theory in this sense, there is a reading of each of them that is not true 




1. Three Instances of Change 
 
Bubbles, chemical reactions, flowers, butterflies, human beings (and so on) 
exist, but do not exist forever. More generally, many things change with 
respect to existence. Hence, the following counts as an instance of change: 
 
EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: things change with respect to 
existence over time.2 
 
 
1 For a classic discussion see McTaggart (1927), Prior (1968) and Williams (1951); for a 
contemporary discussion see Sider (2011, Ch. 11) and Williamson (2013, ch. 8). 
2 Existential Change may take different forms. Some believe it to be true, since they believe 
that things both begin and cease to exist, such as Lowe (2003, 2006, 2009), Prior (1968), 
and Zimmerman (2008); others, think of it to be true because things begin to exist, but then 
do not cease to do so (Correia and Rosenkranz 2018). 
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It is important to be clear about the meaning of ‘exist’ in Existential 
Change: ‘exist’ means here the same as ‘being’ or ‘being something’ or 
‘being identical to something’ in the most unrestricted sense. What I am 
assuming here is the standard meaning of existence assumed by most 
contemporary metaphysicians. 3  So, for a cat to exist is for it to be 
something, for a car to exist is for it to be something, and so on. Nothing 
more or less.  
 
For the sake of convenience, it is useful to introduce a more formal way of 
expressing Existential Change, and the following instances of change. To 
do so, let’s appeal to the language of free tense logic,4 the language that 
implements the language of free logic with the so-called tense operators 
such as the past tense operator ‘It was the case that’ or ‘It is the case at 
some past time that’ (symbolised as ‘P’) and the future tense operator ‘It 
will be the case that’ or ‘It is the case at some future time that’ (symbolised 
as ‘F’). From these, one can further define the operator ‘It is sometimes the 
case that’ or ‘It is the case at some time’ (symbolised as ‘S’, where ‘S𝜑’ is 
defined as ‘5P𝜑 ∨ 𝜑 ∨ F𝜑’), and the operator ‘It is always the case that’ or 
‘It is the case at all times’ (symbolised as ‘A’, where ‘A𝜑’ is defined as 
‘P𝜑 ∧ 𝜑 ∧ F𝜑’). 
 
3 See van Inwagen (2009) for a detailed discussion of the view. 
4 I say free tense logic instead of quantificational tense logic, since the latter arguably 
entails the falsity of Existential Change (see, for instance, Bacon (2013) and Williamson 
(2013)). I will not rehearse all the details of the argument here, but a brief discussion may 
help. Given quantificational tense logic, every instance of ‘∃x a = x’ is proved to be true 
(where ‘a’ stands for any singular term in that language, ‘∃x a = x’ says that there is 
something identical to a). Given the temporal analogue of the rule of necessitation, one can 
infer from the true  that it is always the case that , such that one can infer ‘A(∃x a = x)’ 
(which says that it is always the case that there is something identical to a) from ‘∃x a = x’. 
Now, by the rule of generalization, that allows one to infer from the true  the true ∀x, 
one can infer ‘∀y A(∃x y = x)’ (which says that everything always exists) from ‘A(∃x a = 
x)’. So, given quantificational tense logic, one can prove that everything always exists, thus 
contradicting Existential Change. 
If one adopts a free tense logic, one can deny that every instance of ‘∃x a = x’ is proved to 
be true in the first place. In fact, given a free tense logic, one can reject the axiom of 
universal instantiation of quantificational tense logic, namely ‘∀xx → a’, from which 
‘∃x a = x’ is inferred, and accept the weaker axiom of free universal instantiation, such as 
‘∀y(∀xx → y)’ (which says that for every way everything in the domain is, there is 
something we can name in the domain that is in that way). Therefore, those who accept a 
free tense logic have the logical resources to accept that some instances of ‘∃xa = x’ are 
false, when ‘a’ fails to denote a member of the domain of quantification, and also to resist 
the above argument for the inconsistency between quantificational tense logic and 
Existential Change. 
5 In fact, there the list of tense operators I present is not exhaustive, as there are further tense 
operators such as ‘It has always been the case that’ (symbolised as ‘H’) and ‘It is always 
going to be the case that’ (symbolised as ‘G’). One can also make use of the so-called metric 
tense operators, operators of the form ‘It was the case n units of time ago’. 
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So, one can regiment Existential Change as: 
 
EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: Sometimes, something is not 
always something. (Formally: ‘S(∃x ¬A(∃y y = x))’) 
 
There is not just change in what exists over time, however. Tim was a kid, 
and he is an adult, Lisa is seated, even though she was standing, and Barack 
Obama was the US President, but he is not anymore. Therefore, a further 
instance of change is the following: 
 
QUALITATIVE CHANGE: things change with respect 
to how they are over time.6 
 
If we understand the predicates ‘is adult’, ‘is seated’ and ‘is the US 
President’ as expressing properties or qualities, Qualitative Change 
amounts to the view that things change with respect to properties or 
qualities over time: Tim does not always bear the property of being an 
adult, Lisa does not always bear the property of being seated, and Barack 
Obama does not always bear the property of being the US President. 
 
Qualitative Change is naturally linked with the view that things persist 
through time. Take Lisa: it is not just that Lisa, for example, changes as 
she is seated, but she was standing, but also that Lisa exists and she is 
seated, and existed and she was standing; analogously, Lisa will exist and 
will be standing too. 
 
More specifically, for Lisa to change with respect to her properties, she 
must remain in existence through time. That’s the dynamic phenomenon 
philosophers call persistence: 
 
PERSISTENCE: things persist through time. 
 
For Lisa to change with respect to her properties is not for Lisa to begin to 
exist when she gains the property of being seated, and for her to cease to 
exist when she loses the property of being seated and gains the property of 
being standing. As a matter of fact, Lisa exists both when she is seated and 
when she was and will be standing. It is one and the same thing that both 
changes and persists through time: it is one and the same Lisa that is seated 
and exists, and did exist and was standing. 
 
 
6 Those who believe in Qualitative Change include, for example, Hinchliff (1996) and Prior 
(1968, 78–9). 
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So, Qualitative Change and Persistence count as a single instance of 
change (or so I claim): call this instance of change Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence. One can express Qualitative Change plus Persistence more 
formally as follows, where F stands for some property: 
 
QUALITATIVE CHANGE PLUS PERSISTENCE: 
Sometimes, some x bears some F but x does not always 
bear F. (Formally: ‘S(∃x∃F (Fx ⋀ ￢AFx))’) 
 
The last instance of change that I wish to consider is change in what is the 
case, or what is true, over time. One can derive such instance of change 
from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change. Consider Lisa: since 
Lisa exists, it the case that Lisa exists. Moreover, since Lisa is seated, it is 
the case that Lisa is seated. But Lisa does not always exist and is not always 
seated. Therefore, it is not always the case that Lisa exists or that Lisa is 
seated. By taking talks about “being the case” as equivalent to “being true”, 
where the primary bearers of truth and falsehood are propositions, then one 
can say that the propositions that Lisa exists and that Lisa is seated are 
true, but not always so. As a matter of fact, they change with respect to 
truth value. Here is the third instance of change: 
 
PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: things (i.e., propositions) 
change with respect to truth value over time.7 
 
Very much as with Existential Change and Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence, one can express Propositional Change in more formal 
terms as follows, where ‘p’ stands for a propositional variable: 
 
PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: Sometimes, there is some 
true proposition that is not always true. (Formally: ‘S(∃p 
(p ⋀ ￢A(p))’ 
 
This concludes the presentation of three entirely plausible instances 
of change. 
 
In this paper, my purpose is to argue that the B-theory of time, which 
I will introduce in more detail in the following section (Section 2), is 
consistent with certain readings of such instances of change; thus, in 
this sense, there is change on the B-theory. Nevertheless, I argue that 
there is a reading of each of them that is false on the B-theory, and 
therefore that in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. 
 
7 The view is extensively defended in Borgaard (2012) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) 
among others. 
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The plan for the remaining part of the paper is as follows. In Section 
2, I say more about how to understand the B-theory; in Section 3 I 
discuss the connection between Existential Change and the B-theory; 
in Section 4, I discuss the connection between Qualitative Change 
plus Persistence and the B-theory; in Section 5, I discuss the 
connection between Propositional Change and the B-theory. 
 
 
2. The B-theory of time 
 
B-theorists, those who defend the B-theory of time,8 typically hold that 
reality consists of a four-dimensional block universe, the spacetime of 
relativistic physics9 (in virtue of which it is sometimes also called the 
Scientific view of time), where past, present and future things equally exist, 
and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically the same. 
On this view, for the present time to be present does not designate anything 
of metaphysical significance, as ‘present’ is an indexical expression that 
refers to the time of utterance of such expression. 
 
Consider dinosaurs, for example. B-theorists hold that dinosaurs exist very 
much as you and me; and the same goes for times: B-theorists think that 
the time at which dinosaurs are located exists very much as this time, the 
time at which we are located. In fact, B-theorists think of time as very 
similar to space: very much as all places, and things located at such places, 
equally exist, all times, and things located at such times, equally exist. To 
this, B-theorists add that as for some place to be the place that is here does 
not designate anything of metaphysical importance, for some time to be 
the time that is present does not designate anything of metaphysical 
importance: ‘here’ and ‘present’ are merely indexical expressions that 
refer, respectively, to the place and time at which they are uttered. 
 
A further B-theoretic commitment on which I want to focus is how B-
theorists usually interpret tenses and tense operators, as this will help to 
introduce the B-theoretical readings of Existential Change, Qualitative 
Change plus Persistence and Propositional Change. B-theorists think of 
tense operators as being fully reducible; to describe how reality ultimately 
looks like, B-theorists do not make use of any tense operator. This idea is 
captured by what Sider says in following quotation: 
 
 
8 Some supporters of the B-theory include Deng (2013), Dyke (2002), Leininger (2021), 
Mozersky (2015) and Sider (2001; 2011) and Williams (1951). 
9 As characterized by the pioneering research of Einstein (1952) and Minkowski (1952). 
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[B-theorists] do not admit tense operators into their 
fundamental ideology, since they can describe temporal reality 
without them—by quantifying over past and future entities and 
predicating features of them relative to times. (Sider 2011, 241)  
 
Now we have all the ingredients we need to proceed with the discussion. 




3. Existential Change and the B-theory 
 
Existential Change is the view that things change with respect to their 
existence, and B-theorists might happily grant that Existential Change is 
true on the B-theory. Consider the more formal version of Existential 
Change, namely ‘Sometimes, something is not always something’. Now, 
there is a reading of Existential Change that is true on the B-theory, and to 
see that we must be clear about what it is for something to be such that it 
is sometimes something, or that it sometimes exists. As stated in the 
previous section, tense operators such as ‘Sometimes’ or, equivalently, ‘It 
is sometime the case that’ are fully reducible on the B-theory.10 In fact, 
according to B-theorists, tense operators are fully reducible to quantifiers 
over past, present and future times, as Sider makes clear in the passage 
quoted in the previous section: for something to be such that it sometimes 
exists is for it to be such that there is a time at which it exists. In other 
words, B-theorists reduce expressions of the form ‘sometimes, x exists’ to 
expressions of the form ‘x exists at some time t’. Accordingly, Existential 
Change reduces to the following: 
  
EC-1: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x exists at t 
but x does not exist at t1 
 
And EC-1 is true on the B-theory. Consider dinosaurs, for example: it is 
true that dinosaurs exist at some times but not at others. 
 
However, contemporary research on the topic suggests that expressions of 
the form ‘x exists at t’ are inherently ambiguous (Correia and Rosenkranz 
2019; Deasy 2019; Markosian 2014): on one reading, they are equivalent 
to expressions of the form ‘x is located at t’; whereas on another reading, 
 
10 Defenders of Existential Change like Prior (1968) or Crisp (2007) accept the partial (but 
not full) reducibility of tense operators to quantifiers over times, where times are intended 
as maximal, consistent, and sometimes-true propositions. However, since times are defined 
as “sometimes true” propositions, tense operators do not fully reduce to quantifiers over 
times. 
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they are equivalent to expressions of the form ‘at t, x is something’. Thus, 
on the first reading, ‘x exists at t’ is understood in locational terms, such 
that to say that something exists at a time is to make a claim about where 
things are located in time; on the second reading, ‘x exists at t’ is 
understood in perspectival terms, such that to say that something exists at 
a time t is to make a claim about what there is relative to (i.e. from the 
perspective of) t. 
 
If expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are equivalent to expressions of the 
form ‘x is located at t’, then Existential Change is true on the B-theory, 
since one can think of EC-1 as equivalent to the following: 
 
EC-2: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x is located 
at t but x is not located at t1 
 
EC-2 is true on the B-theory. 
 
However, one can read Existential Change as a thesis about what there is 
in time, rather than about where things are located in time. On this reading, 
Existential Change becomes a thesis about there being change in what there 
is over time. And on this reading, Existential Change is false on the B-
theory. Or so I argue. 
 
In order to develop this argument, I wish to consider the modal analogue 
of the B-theory, namely Modal Realism, on which actual things exist just 
as possible things do, and the actual world and non-actual worlds are 
metaphysically the same, notably defended by Lewis (1986). Modal 
Realists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at world w’ very much 
as B-theorists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at time t’. 
Accordingly, we can disambiguate between two readings of expressions of 
the form ‘x exists at world w’, as either equivalent to ‘x is located at w’ or 
‘at w, x is something’. 
 
Now, consider the following quotation from Lewis (1986):  
 
The phrase ‘at W’ which appears within the scope of the 
quantifier, […] works mainly by restricting the domains of 
quantifiers in its scope, in much the same way that the 
restricting modifier ‘in Australia’ does. […] [However] I do 
not suppose that they must restrict all quantifiers in their scope, 
without exception. […] ‘At some small worlds, there is a 
natural number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can 
be true even if the large number that makes it true is no part of 
the small world. (Lewis 1986, 6) 
Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time? 
 13 
In the first half of the quotation, Lewis is referring to the first reading of ‘x 
exists at world w’, where w, a world, is where some x is located. In the 
second half of the quotation, Lewis speaks of the second reading of ‘x 
exists at world w’, and says that sentences such as ‘At w, there is a natural 
number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can be true, even if 
such natural number is not located at w. In other words, irrespective of the 
location of such natural number, it is true of it that it is something, or it 
exists, given Modal Realism. So, Lewis is here suggesting that when 
attached to claims about what there is, irrespective of the location, in the 
modal space, the phrase ‘at w’ is irrelevant: that there is a natural number 
too big to measure any class of individuals is true even at worlds at which 
it is not located. 
 
Let’s apply the understanding of expressions of the form ‘at t, x is 
something’ proposed by Lewis to the temporal case. To do so, consider the 
sentence ‘at t, there is a dinosaur’: ‘There is a dinosaur’ is true on the B-
theory, even if there are no dinosaurs located at t. So, when attached to 
claims about what there is, irrespective of the location, in time, the phrase 
‘at t’ seems to be irrelevant on the B-theory too: ‘There is a dinosaur’ is 
true on the B-theory, even at times at which dinosaurs are not located. 
 
In light of that, one can argue that there is a reading of Existential Change 
that is false on the B-theory as there is a reading of Permanentism, the view 
that ‘Everything always exists’, namely the negation of Existential 
Change, which is true on the B-theory. To see that, let’s reduce 
Permanentism to the view ‘Everything exists at every time’,11 and let’s 
disambiguate between two versions of Permanentism in accordance with 
the disambiguation of the expression ‘x exists at t’: 
 
P1: Everything is located at every time 
P2: At every time, everything is something 
 
P1 appears to be false:12 it is false that dinosaurs are located at every time, 
as they are not located at this time. However, ‘Everything is something’ is 
(trivially) true at every time: it is true at this time that some dinosaur exists, 
for example, even though there are no dinosaurs located at this time. So, 
there is a reading of Permanentism, namely P2, that is true on the B-theory. 
 
 
11 Given the reducibility of tense operators proposed by B-theorists, for something to be 
always something is for it to exist at every time. 
12  Unless one accepts some less-standard view on which, for example, there are just 
eternally existent atoms. On this view, P1 turns out to be true. 
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However, when ‘x exists at t’ is read at ‘at t, x is something’, namely when 
expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are read as making claims about what 
there is, irrespective of the location, in time, P2 is equivalent to 
Permanentism. In very much the same way, one can read Existential 
Change as making a claim about what there is, irrespective of the location, 
in time: 
 
EC-3: for some times t and t1, at t, x is something and at 
t1 x is nothing 
 
However, the B-theory is inconsistent with this reading of Existential 
Change, since on the B-theory there is no change in what there is, 
irrespective of the location, in time. 
 
As we have seen, there is a sense in which Existential Change is true on 
the B-theory, and so in this sense there is change on the B-theory; however, 
there is also a reading of Existential Change that is inconsistent with the 
B-theory, such that in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. 
We can make a very similar claim with respect to Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence, as I argue in the following section. 
 
 
4. Qualitative Change plus Persistence and the B-theory 
 
As we needed to be clear about what is for something to sometimes exist 
on the B-theory, in order to explore its connection with Existential Change, 
we now have to be clear about what is for something to sometimes bear 
some property on the B-theory, in order to explore the connection between 
the B-theory and Qualitative Change plus Persistence (from now on, 
simply QCP).13 
 
Think again of the above quotation from Sider (2011, 241). Sider remarks 
that B-theorists can describe things over time by “predicating features of 
them relative to times (italic mine)”, such that for something to sometimes 
bear some property is for it to bear some property at some time. Therefore, 
B-theorists think of expressions of the form ‘sometimes, x is F’ as reducing 
to ‘x bears F at some time t’. However, different B-theorists understand 
expressions of the form ‘x bears F at some time t’ in different ways. In this 
section, I explore different B-theoretical interpretations of such expression, 
and I explore their connection with QCP. 
 
 
13 For a discussion of how the B-theory connects with what I call Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence see Cameron (2015, 152-159) and Wasserman (2006). 
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To begin with, consider what Lewis says in the following quotation: 
 
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it 
exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something 
perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or 
stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly 
present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists 
by being wholly present at more than one time. (Lewis 1986, 
202) 
 
Accordingly, Perdurance is the view on which things persist by perduring 
and Endurance is the view that things persist by enduring. More recently, 
philosophers have introduced a further notion of persistence called 
Exdurance (Hawley 2001; Sider 1996), on which things persist by 
exduring, namely by having different temporal counterparts at different 
times. Depending on whether one endorses Perdurance, Endurance or 
Exdurance (plus the B-theory) one delivers a different interpretation of ‘x 
bears F at t’. My plan in what follows is to discuss each option in order. 
 
4.1 B-theoretic Perdurance 
 
Perdurance as defended, for example, by Heller (1984), Lewis (1986) and 
Quine (1950) is the view that things persist by having different temporal 
parts at different times. Think of Lisa again. Lisa persists by having 
different temporal parts at different times. Then, on Perdurance, for Lisa 
to change from being standing to being seated, is for Lisa to have a 
temporal part that is standing and a later temporal part that is seated.  
 
For the sake of a better understanding of Perdurance, we must get a better 
grip on what temporal parts are. Temporal parts are usefully characterized 
by analogy with spatial parts: as things have spatial parts, such as Lisa has 
a spatial part, such as her arm, and another spatial part, such as her leg, 
Lisa also has temporal parts, such as one that is standing and another that 
is seated. 
 
Both spatial and temporal parts can be understood as spatially and 
temporally extended: as Lisa’s arm is extended through space, Lisa’s 
temporal part that is standing can be taken to be temporally extended too. 
However, as Lewis (and many others) defines the notion of temporal parts, 
temporal parts exist at times, and since times are instantaneous objects, 
temporal parts are naturally understood as instantaneous too: thus, x is an 
instantaneous temporal part of y if and only if (Sider 2001, 59) x is part of 
y, x overlaps, or shares, any part of y, and x exists only at a single time. In 
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what follows, for the sake of simplicity, when I speak of ‘temporal parts’ I 
mean ‘instantaneous temporal parts’. 
 
Thus, perdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x bears F at t’ 
as equivalent to ‘one of x’s temporal parts is F and is located at t’. 
Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory, namely: 
 
QCP-1: for some times t and t1, there is some x, y and z such 
that y, one of x’s temporal parts, is F and is located at t, and z, 
another of x’s temporal parts, is not-F and is located at t1 
 
So, perdurantists accept the truth of QCP by treating possession of 
properties as possession of properties relative to times; and then, by 
analysing possession of properties relative to times as possession of 
properties by temporal parts. In this sense, there is change on B-theory, as 
there is change given Perdurance. 
 
However, there is also a reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent with 
Perdurance. Let me expand on that. On this alternative reading, it is Lisa 
the thing that is seated simpliciter and it is Lisa who changes with respect 
to that property. On the contrary, defenders of B-theoretic Perdurance think 
that it is not Lisa, but one of her temporal parts – call it T-Lisa – which is 
seated simpliciter. However, as an instantaneous object, T-Lisa does not 
persist, and therefore does not change with respect to her being seated, as 
there is no other time at which it is located and bears the property of being 
standing. So, T-Lisa does not change with respect to the property of being 
seated: T-Lisa is always seated. 
 
The result is that B-theoretic Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal 
possession (simpliciter) of properties by temporal parts. Moreover, on the 
assumption that there is a sense in which B-theorists accept Permanentism–
–the view that everything always exists––B-theorists accept that in some 
sense it is true that temporal parts always exist. So, B-theoretic 
Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal possession of properties by 
eternally existent temporal parts. But one can read QCP as being about 
Lisa’s changing with respect to her properties while persisting through 
time, while the B-theoretic Perdurantist’s explanation of such a 
phenomenon bottoms out in permanent facts about the eternal properties 
of (eternal) temporal parts. B-theoretic Perdurance is thus inconsistent with 
this reading of QCP. 
 
In the next section I show how a similar argument applies to B-theoretic 
Exdurance too. 
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4.2 B-theoretic Exdurance 
 
Distinct from Perdurance, Exdurance as defended by, for instance, Hawley 
(2001) and Sider (1996), among others, is the view that ordinary things are 
not temporally extended things, but instantaneous temporal parts, or 
stages, and for something to persist is for it to have different temporal 
counterparts at different times. Think of Lisa: Lisa persists by having 
different temporal counterparts at different times. Then, on Exdurance, for 
Lisa to change from being standing to being seated, is for Lisa, an 
instantaneous stage, to be seated, and to have a temporal counterpart that 
is standing.  
 
One of the main novelties of Exdurance is the introduction of the notion of 
temporal counterparts: to get a better sense about what a temporal 
counterpart is, an analogy with the modal case is instructive. David Lewis’ 
notion of modal counterpart (Lewis 1968) is probably the best place for 
that: the point here is to get a sense of how, for example, Lisa modally 
persists. For Lisa to modally persist is for Lisa to have various modal 
counterparts at various worlds, where for something to be a modal 
counterpart of Lisa is to resemble Lisa in all her relevant features (Lewis 
1968, 114; Sider 2001, 111–2). For example, ‘Lisa is seated but might be 
standing’ is true because Lisa modally persists by having a modal 
counterpart at some world, which resembles Lisa in all her relevant 
features, and it is standing. The same applies to the temporal case. For Lisa 
to persist is for Lisa to have different temporal counterparts at various 
times, which resemble Lisa in all her relevant features. Then, ‘Lisa is 
seated but was standing’ is true because the Lisa that is seated has a 
temporal counterpart at some time, which resembles Lisa in all her relevant 
features, and it is standing. 
 
Thus, Exdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ as ‘x 
is F and is located at t’, by treating the variable ‘x’ as taking in only 
instantaneous stages. In other words, according to Exdurantists, the name 
‘Lisa’ does not refer to an object that exists at different times, but to an 
instantaneous stage. Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is true on 
the B-theory, namely: 
 
QCP-2: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that x is F 
and is located at t, and there is some y, one of x’s temporal 
counterparts, such that y is not-F and is located at t1 
 
So, exdurantists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as 
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by analysing 
possession of properties relative to times as possession of properties by 
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instantaneous stages. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there 
is change given Exdurance. 
 
Still, there is an alternative reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent 
with Exdurance. On this reading of QCP, it is Lisa who is seated, and it is 
that thing that persists through time: distinct from defenders of Perdurance, 
defenders of Exdurance accept that. However, on this reading of QCP, 
‘Lisa’ refers to a temporally extended object and not to an instantaneous 
thing, as it does according to Exdurance. In light of that, there is a sense in 
which things do not persist given Exdurance, and that’s the sense in which 
things persist given this reading of QCP: Lisa exists, but did exist and will 
exist too. As an instantaneous thing, however, Lisa does not persist in this 
sense on Exdurance: instantaneous things are, by definition, things that do 
not exist at multiple times, and in this sense, it is false that Lisa did exist 
and will exist too given Exdurance. 
 
So, in that sense, Lisa does not persist on Exdurance; but if Lisa does not 
persist in this sense, Lisa does not change too, as there is no other time at 
which it exists and is, for example, standing. If she does not change and 
persist in this sense, namely the sense in which things change and persist 
given this reading of QCP do, Exdurance is inconsistent with this reading 
of QCP. Thus, there is no change on the B-theory, as there is no change on 
Exdurance. 
 
There are further elements that make one worry about the consistency of 
QCP, on this reading, and Exdurance. First, while given this reading of 
QCP, the Lisa that exists and is seated is one and the same with the Lisa 
that did exist and was standing, given Exdurance, the Lisa that exists and 
is seated is not one and the same with her earlier temporal counterpart that 
is standing. As a matter of fact, given Exdurance, the two are not identical, 
but resemble each other with respect to their relevant features. Such 
resemblance-relation, however, is deliberately context sensitive, as it is the 
notion of “relevant features”. As a matter of fact, we may deliberately refer 
to one set of features S in one context according to which the Lisa that is 
seated and the Lisa that is standing resemble each other, and to another set 
of features S* in another context according to which the two do not 
resemble each other. 
 
As a consequence, there is no fixed set of relevant features according to 
which temporal counterparts resemble each other: such set varies from 
situation to situation and the choice of such set is entirely arbitrary. 
However, on Exdurance things persist by being related via a relation of 
resemblance in relevant features; so, Persistence becomes a deliberately 
context sensitive phenomenon as well. On the contrary, given the reading 
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of QCP under consideration, Persistence is not deliberately context 
sensitive: it is one and the same thing, namely Lisa, that changes and 
persists over time. 
 
Moreover, given Exdurance, we have a series of instantaneous stages that 
persist by resembling each other with respect to some relevant features. In 
other words, we have a series of instantaneous stages lined up in time, 
related to one another by a relation of resemblance in all the relevant 
features. In such a series, we have the Lisa that is seated and the Lisa that 
is standing. But who is the persisting Lisa? This Lisa, namely the Lisa that 
is seated, or that Lisa, the Lisa that is standing? The choice is entirely 
arbitrary. 14  On the contrary, given the reading of QCP under 
consideration, there is no choice to be made: there’s only one Lisa, and 
that’s the persisting thing, and that’s the Lisa that is seated.  
 
Exdurance is thus inconsistent with this reading of QCP, and in this sense 
there is no change on Exdurance, and then on the B-theory. Let’s now 
move to the final view I wish to discuss, namely B-theoretic Endurance. 
 
4.3 B-theoretic Endurance 
 
Endurance, as defined by Lewis, is the view that things persist by being 
wholly present at different times. Defining Endurance in these terms raises 
several difficulties.15 It is not my aim here to try to fix some of such 
difficulties. What I plan to do, instead, is to look at a couple of ways in 
which self-described endurantists characterize the view and expand on 
their connection with QCP. 
 
4.3.1 B-theoretic Relationalism 
 
Let’s begin with the view I call Relationalism as defended by Mellor 
(1998) and Mozersky (2015), among others, according to which 
expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are interpreted as ‘x is F-at-t’, namely 
the view on which things have different time-indexed properties. Time-
indexed properties are properties such as being-a-kid-at-t or being-red-at-
t1 and so on. Think of Lisa: for Lisa to change from being standing to being 




14 Note that the question is not “who is the Lisa that is seated?”, as the Lisa that is seated is 
plausibly taken to be the Lisa that exists at the time of utterance of the sentence ‘Lisa is 
seated’. 
15 See Sider (2001, 63–68) for a discussion of such problems. 
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Granted the relationalist’s reading of expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’, 
there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory, namely: 
 
QCP-3: for two times t and t1, there is some x such that x 
is F-at-t and not-F-at-t1 
 
So, Relationalists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as 
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating properties 
as time-indexed properties, where the index corresponds to time relative to 
which the relevant property is said to be possessed in the first place.16 In 
this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there is change on 
Relationalism. 
 
While there is a reading of QCP that is true given Relationalism, there is a 
further reading of QCP that is inconsistent with Relationalism: on this 
reading, Lisa changes with respect to her being seated, and being seated is 
a temporary property. I claim that what are temporary properties given this 
reading of QCP become eternal properties given Relationalism. To see 
that, consider the property of being seated: given QCP, being seated is a 
temporary property, where a temporary property is a property that is 
sometimes but not always possessed. As a matter of fact, Lisa is seated, 
but not always seated. In other words, Lisa does not bear any indexed 
property such as the property of being-seated-at-t, as she is simply seated, 
and not always so. 
 
On the contrary, B-theoretic Relationalists think that for Lisa to be such 
that she was standing and is seated reduces to her bearing the properties of 
being-standing-at-t1 and being-seated-at-t, where t1 is earlier than t. The 
problem is then that Lisa never changes with respect to being-seated-at-t 
and being-standing-at-t1. Consider being-seated-at-t: being-seated-at-t is 
an eternal property, where for a property to be eternal given the B-theory 
is for it to be such that if something bears it, it always bears it.17 As a matter 
of fact, it is true at every time that Lisa bears the property of being-seated-
at-t. If so, however, Lisa never changes with respect to this property: Lisa 
is always seated-at-t. 
 
Given the reading of QCP under consideration, however, Lisa changes 
with respect to the property of being seated, which is a temporary, rather 
than eternal, property, that is a property that Lisa has, but not always. Even 
 
16  The view is notably criticized in Lewis (1986, 204), with the so called temporary 
intrinsics objection. 
17It is important to notice that unlike the B-theory, on the view on which there is change in 
what exists, irrespective of the location, in time, a property that something always bears, 
namely an eternal property, would be a property that something bears whenever it exists. 
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if B-theoretic Relationalists attempt to explain this reading of QCP, they 
do so by reducing temporary properties onto eternal ones, such as time-
indexed properties. Since, on this reading QCP, properties such as being 
seated are temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic Relationalism is 
ultimately inconsistent with it. 
 
Before concluding this section, I wish to consider a slightly different 
version of Relationalism as defended, for example, by van Inwagen 
(1990):18 on this view, expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are interpreted 
as ‘x is-F-at t’, namely the view on which things bear different relations 
with different times. Think of Lisa again: for Lisa to change from being 
standing to being seated, given this version of Relationalism, is for Lisa to 
be-standing-at t1 and to be-seated-at t. 
 
I am persuaded to think that this version of Relationalism is inconsistent 
with the reading of QCP under consideration too. As a matter of fact, very 
much as time-indexed properties, relations to times always hold: Lisa 
always bears the relation of being-standing-at with t1 and the relation of 
being-seated-at with t. On this reading of QCP, being seated, for example, 
is a temporary property, that becomes a permanent relation that Lisa bears 
with some time given this version of Relationalism. Therefore, also this 
version of Relationalism is inconsistent with this reading of QCP. 
 
4.3.2 B-theoretic Adverbialism 
 
Adverbialism, the view defended by Haslanger (1989), Johnston and 
Forbes (1987) and Miller and Braddon-Mitchell (2007), among others, is 
the view according to which expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ reduce to 
‘x is-at-t F’, where the instantiation-relation between properties and their 
bearers is time-indexed. Then, for Lisa to change from being standing to 
being seated is for Lisa to be-at-t1 standing and to be-at-t seated. 
 
Granted the adverbialist’s understanding of expressions of the form ‘x is F 
at t’, there is a reading of QCP that is true one the B-theory: 
 
QCP-4: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that 
x is-at-t F and x is-not-at-t1 F 
 
So, Adverbialists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as 
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating the 
instantiation-relation as time-indexed, where the index corresponds to time 
 
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing me to consider this version 
of Relationalism too. 
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relative to which the relevant property is said to be possessed in the first 
place. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there is change on 
Adverbialism.19 
 
I think that there is an argument like the one I raised against B-theoretic 
Relationalism to show that there is a reading of QCP that is inconsistent 
with B-theoretic Adverbialism: on this reading of QCP, Lisa changes with 
respect to her being seated, as she is temporarily seated.20 What I believe 
to be problematic is that there is a reading of QCP on which temporary 
ways of bearing properties are transformed into eternal ways given B-
theoretic Adverbialism. If we say that for something to bear a property 
temporarily is for it to be such that it bears some property but not always, 
then on this reading of QCP, Lisa, for instance, temporarily bears the 
property of being seated, as she is seated but not always so. In other words, 
Lisa does not bear-at-t some property, but she simply bears the property of 
being seated. However, very much as time-indexed properties are always 
had, the time-indexed instantiation-relation always holds, since if 
something bears-at-t some property F, it always bears-at-t F. As a matter 
of fact, bearing-at-t is an eternal way of bearing properties: things do not 
change with respect to their bearing certain properties if they bear-at-times 
properties. Given our example, for Lisa to be-at-t seated is for Lisa to 
always be-at-t seated, as it is the case at every time that Lisa is-at-t seated: 
Lisa does not change with respect to her being-at-t seated. 
 
On the contrary, on the reading of QCP under consideration, Lisa changes 
with respect to her being seated, as Lisa temporarily bears the property of 
being seated. Even if B-theoretic Adverbialists attempt to explain this 
reading of QCP, they do so by reducing the temporary instantiation of 
properties to an eternal one, such as the time-indexed instantiation of 
properties. Since on this reading of QCP, the instantiation of properties is 
temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic Adverbialism is ultimately 
inconsistent with it. 
 
This concludes the discussion of how the B-theory connects with QCP. In 
the following, and last, section, I plan to say more about Propositional 






19 For a famous objection against Adverbialism see Lewis (2002), according to whom 
Adverbialism lands us in a version of Bradley’s regress.  
20For some objections to Adverbialism see Lewis (2002).  
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5. Propositional Change and the B-theory 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, I argued that one can derive Propositional 
Change from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence: since Lisa exists, but not always, the proposition that Lisa 
exists is true, but not always; analogously, since Lisa is seated, but not 
always, the proposition that Lisa is seated is true, but not always. 
 
From this, one can infer that since there is a reading of Existential Change 
and Qualitative Change plus Persistence that is inconsistent with the B-
theory, there is a reading of Propositional Change that is inconsistent with 
the B-theory. Let’s expand on that. 
 
To begin with, let’s consider B-theoretical views on which expressions of 
the form ‘sometimes, p is true’ are interpreted as ‘p is true at t’, namely on 
which propositions have truth-value relative to times. Here are two 
versions of the B-theoretic proposal: on one conception, analogous to the 
modal case where propositions are properties of worlds, propositions are 
considered as properties of instants (Lewis 1979); on another conception, 
propositions are functions from instants to truth values (Sider 2001, 20–1). 
On both views, Propositional Change is true because the following is true: 
 
PC-1: for some times t and t1, there is some p such that p 
is true at t, but p is not true at t1 
 
More precisely, on the view that propositions are properties of instants, to 
say that the proposition that Lisa exists is true relative to a certain time t is 
just to say that t possesses the property of being a time at which Lisa exists. 
Hence, on this view, to say that a certain proposition changes in truth value 
over time is just to say that the property F of times identified with that 
proposition is possessed by some but not all times. 
 
On the view on which propositions are functions from times to truth values, 
the truth of that Lisa exists depends on the instant of time we plug into the 
function. Hence, to say that propositions change in truth value is to say that 
the function f identified with a proposition delivers truth for some but not 
all times as inputs. In both views, Propositional Change turns out to be true, 
and therefore there is change in this sense on the B-theory. 
 
In doing so, both views preserve the truth of Propositional Change by 
interpreting what is for something to be sometimes true in terms of truth-
relative to times. Doing that, however, make them inconsistent with an 
alternative reading of Propositional Change: on this reading of 
Propositional Change, propositions are not true relative to times, very 
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much as one can read Existential Change as the view on which things do 
not exist relative to times, and one can read Qualitative Change plus 
Persistence as the view on which things do not have properties relative to 
times. On this reading, propositions have truth values simpliciter. 
 
So, on this reading of Propositional Change, some proposition, such as that 
Lisa exists, is true simpliciter, but not always. On this reading of 
Propositional Change, propositions do not change with respect to truth 
value if they always have the truth value they have. In fact, on this reading 
of Propositional Change, propositions that are true relative to times, are 
always true if true: if it is true at t that Lisa is seated, it is always true at t 
that Lisa is seated, as it is true at every time that it is true at t that Lisa is 
seated. Thus, on this reading of Propositional Change, propositions that are 
true relative to times always have the truth value they have. Thus, treating 
truth as relative to times lead to a reduction of Propositional Change, such 
as PC1, which is ultimately inconsistent with the reading of Propositional 





The result of this paper is that, granted different understandings of what it 
is for things to change, we end up having different responses to the 
question as to whether there is change on the B-theory. By considering 
three instances of change, such as Existential Change, Qualitative Change 
plus Persistence and Propositional Change, I argued that we can read those 
theses such that they are all true on the B-theory. In this sense, there is 
change on the B-theory. However, I claimed there are alternative readings 
of each of them that are false on the B-theory: so, in this other sense, there 
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